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Abstract 
 
Although Bangladesh was initially spared the worst consequences of the global financial crisis, the 
lagged impacts have started to become visible, transmitted by means of various channels. Overall, 
export earnings have remained robust, driven by readymade garment exports, but volatility has 
increased. In the third quarter of 2009, there was a significant fall in exports, with apparel exports also 
falling victim to sluggish demand. At the same time, policies pursued by competitors have had an 
adverse impact on Bangladesh’s competitive strength in the global market.  
 
To address the emerging tasks of stimulating domestic demand and increasing export competitiveness, 
Bangladesh put in place two consecutive stimulus packages, went for a higher budget deficit and 
adopted a number of other countercyclical measures.  
 
Remittance inflows have remained robust until now: the number of terminally returned workers is 
insignificant against the large stock of workers managing to stay working overseas. However, a lower 
number of outward migrants has given rise to concerns with regard to future inflows of remittances, and 
has also put pressure on the domestic labour market.  
 
The gross domestic product (GDP) growth projection of 5.5% for 2009/10 is the lowest in recent years, 
holding consequences for jobs and incomes. The available evidence does not suggest a large number 
of factories being shut down as a result of the crisis, nor does it indicate significant retrenchment in 
apparels and other export-oriented sectors; however, overtime payments and new recruitments have 
suffered.  
 
On the other hand, with the majority of the population making a living from agriculture, good harvests 
have meant that the poverty impact of the crisis may have been limited. An earlier fall in commodity 
prices has also been beneficial with regard to the real incomes of the poor. With remittance inflows 
holding, these factors have had a positive impact on the poverty situation in Bangladesh. 
 
Bangladesh has been somewhat of an outlier in this crisis. However, in view of a jobless recovery, 
Bangladesh will need to pursue a proactive policy, one which continues with countercyclical measures 
and at the same time is forward looking, to exploit the advantages arising from the expected global 
economic recovery. Effective and timely implementation of the recently announced support measures 
will be of importance in this context. To do this, Bangladesh will need to improve its investment climate 
significantly through better power and infrastructure provisions. 
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1. Introduction  
 
The impacts of the global financial crisis have been felt in the increasingly globally integrated economy 
of Bangladesh in a very distinctive manner. In a number of ways, Bangladesh has been an outlier, with 
some lag to the consequences. Indeed, crisis impacts were felt in a much more intense manner in the 
second half of 2009, when many developed countries (Bangladesh’s major import sources and export 
destinations) were beginning to recover. This lagged response makes the Bangladesh story somewhat 
different from that of many other low-income countries (LICs).  
 
The crisis has left its fingerprints on Bangladesh’s externally driven economy through the various 
transmission channels of exports, imports, remittances and aid and foreign direct investment (FDI) 
flows, with consequent repercussions for the labour market, domestic resource mobilisation and gross 
domestic product (GDP) growth and poverty. Nevertheless, the depth of the consequences has tended 
to vary during different phases in the crisis. Two such phases can be discerned from an analysis of the 
impact of the ongoing crisis.  
 
In the first phase, ending with the first quarter of 2009, impacts through the various channels, although 
present, were relatively subdued.3
 
 Bangladesh was one of very few developing countries not to be 
affected to the extent expected. Although exports of primary products suffered early shocks through 
falling demand, at the aggregate level export performance continued with double-digit growth, driven 
by steady performance of apparels exports until the end of the first quarter of 2009. At the same time, 
despite cases of early retrenchment of workers abroad, remittance flows continued to be robust, thanks 
to the large stock of workers managing to stay overseas and continuing to send money home.  
However, a study on the impact of the crisis (Rahman et al., 2009a) cautioned that Bangladesh could 
face a lagged response, with further deepening of the crisis towards the second half of 2009. In fact, 
some indications of trouble began to be felt even in the second quarter of the year. This was reflected 
in the response of policymakers in terms of macroeconomic management, attempts at countercyclical 
measures and the stimulus packages put in place to address the emerging challenges.  
 
Figure 1: Transmission of the crisis 
 
Global financial crisis 
 
 
 
Macro-level shocks 
Trade 
(export, import, remittance) 
Capital flows Government budget Aid 
 
 
 
Transmission mechanisms can be influenced by social protection 
Public and private 
transfers 
Prices Assets Employment Access to goods 
and services 
 
 
 
 
Poverty 
 
Source: Adapted from McCord and Vandemoortele (2009). 
                                                          
3 A detailed analysis of the impacts of the global financial crisis on the Bangladeshi economy, through the various 
transmission channels, is presented in Global Financial Crisis Discussion Paper 1: Bangladesh (May 2009) (Rahman et al., 
2009a), which was part of an ODI project titled ‘The Global Financial Crisis and Developing Countries’. 
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This paper tracks and traces the impact of the crisis on the Bangladeshi economy through the different 
transmission channels and their economy-wide and sectoral impacts (Figure 1). It provides an analysis 
of the fiscal and financial policies taken and the stimulus packages put in place by the Government of 
Bangladesh (GoB) to address the emergent challenges, and seeks to assess the efficacy of these. It 
also puts forward a set of policy recommendations perceived to be important as the Bangladeshi 
economy emerges from the current slowdown and prepares to take advantage of a possible recovery.  
 
The paper is based on an analysis of secondary data and literature, government policy documents, 
cross-country experiences and media reports. Focus group discussions (FGDs) and interviews with 
relevant stakeholders generated more in-depth insights and information. 
 
The rest of the paper is divided into four sections. Section 2 revisits the various transmission channels 
to evaluate the impact of the crisis on Bangladesh’s economy. Section 3 carries out an analysis of the 
policies undertaken by GoB in view of the crisis. Section 4 presents some policy recommendations. 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
 3 
2. Impacts on the Bangladesh economy: Revisiting the 
transmission channels 
 
Over the past couple of decades, Bangladesh has become increasingly integrated into the global 
economy.4 The degree of openness of the economy rose from 16.8% to 42.5% and the extent of 
globalisation increased from 24.9% to 56.3% between 1990/91 and 2008/09.5
 
 Although increasing 
global integration has created an opportunity for Bangladesh to take advantage of the global economy, 
it has also exposed the country to vulnerabilities emanating from global shocks. Indeed, the ongoing 
global financial crisis encompasses many of the challenges that a low-income economy such as 
Bangladesh faces as it strives to become integrated into the global economy.  
As is evident from the subsequent analysis, impacts on Bangladesh’s economy through the 
transmission channels were rather limited in the first phase of the crisis,6 but adverse consequences 
have become more evident in recent times (since April 2009). Despite some volatility, export 
performance showed resilience until March 2009, but the second and third quarters of the year saw a 
considerable fall in total export earnings. On the other hand, imports (in value terms) have fallen 
consistently during the crisis phase, in view of falling global commodity prices, resulting in a 
comfortable balance of payments situation. Although the outflow of migrant workers has slowed, as a 
result of limited scope for new jobs, remittance flows have remained buoyant throughout. New official 
development assistance (ODA) opportunities have been created to mitigate the crisis,7
 
 although these 
have been constrained, largely by a lack of domestic absorption capacity. Bangladesh’s government 
revenue mobilisation structure is characterised to a large extent by import-related sources; falling 
imports have therefore meant that government revenue mobilisation has been particularly affected. The 
slowdown in exports and the lack of opportunities in job markets abroad have had adverse impacts on 
the domestic labour market. A detailed analysis of the impact of the crisis on the Bangladeshi 
economy, through the various transmission channels, is presented in the following subsections.  
2.1 Export performance 
 
With the deepening of the global financial crisis and the consequent slump in developed country 
demand for exported goods from developing countries, a significant slump in global exports was 
expected. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimate of global trade growth for 2008 (made in 
October 2008), of 15.3%, was revised downward to 11.2% (actual). Moreover, the updated projections 
indicated a contraction of -12.0% for 2009, alluding to a severe fall in global trade. In this context, 
Bangladesh’s export performance in 2008/09 was quite remarkable: growth in this year was a 
respectable 10.3% (Table 1). It is particularly interesting to note that this record was attained against 
the backdrop of high growth rates of 15.6% and 15.9% in the previous two fiscal years. Export growth of 
apparels, which contribute about three-quarters of total export earnings, held strong. Two of the major 
contributors, knit and woven RMG (readymade garments), also maintained impressive growth figures: 
17.4% and 13.2%, respectively, compared with the last fiscal year (2007/08).  
 
Widespread apprehension regarding a possible slowdown in apparels exports was proven for 
Bangladesh only partially – in the first quarter of 2009 (January-March), total exports registered 6.0% 
growth (y-o-y), although the growth rate became negative (-0.6%) in the second quarter (April-June). 
                                                          
4 Tariff rates have been rationalised significantly, the anti-export bias has largely been removed, both exports and imports 
have been derestricted and a host of incentives have been put in place to stimulate and encourage export-oriented activities. 
5 Degree of openness is defined as share of export and import as a percentage of GDP. Extent of globalisation is defined as 
export + import + official development assistance + remittance + foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP. 
Bangladesh’s fiscal year runs from July to June. 
6 In the context of Bangladesh, the first phase of the crisis refers to the period from September 2008 to March 2009. 
7 More on this issue is in Section 2.5. 
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This is an indication of increasing volatility in Bangladesh’s export performance in view of the crisis,8 
explained by some by the so-called ‘Wal-Mart effect’.9
 
 In fact, 2008/09 as a whole experienced some 
volatility: exports faced difficulties in view of falling demand in the second quarter of the fiscal year 
(October-December 2008). Export growth of knit and woven RMG decelerated considerably in the fourth 
quarter of the fiscal year (April-June 2009) (y-o-y), posting 4.0% and 3.6% growth, respectively. In 
contrast with RMG exports in the same quarter (total 3.8%), exports of non-RMG products declined by  
-14.8%, with all non-RMG exports, other than raw jute, posting negative growth rates. The leather 
industry was particularly affected: exports of leather declined by 46.8% compared with the previous 
fiscal year.  
Table 1: Quarterly export growth in value of Bangladesh’s major commodities, 2008/09 and 
2009/10Q1 (%)  
 2008/09 (Jul-Jun) 2009/10 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Jul-Jun Q1 
RMG 44.6 5.4 12.7 3.8 15.4 -9.7 
 Woven RMG 36.7 6.3 9.9 4.0 13.2 -9.7 
 Knit RMG 52.0 4.6 15.8 3.6 17.4 -9.7 
Non-RMG 35.7 -22.2 -16.4 -14.8 -5.8 -13.1 
  Raw jute -27.6 5.6 -38.1 22.0 -10.5 27.9 
  Tea 36.3 -28.5 -41.5 -56.6 -17.3 -85.6 
  Frozen foods 15.7 -24.3 -32.2 -21.0 -14.8 -37.9 
  Leather -6.3 -50.2 -41.4 -46.8 -37.6 -24.6 
  Jute goods -4.3 -32.1 -18.1 -7.2 -15.4 5.2 
  Chemical 195.8 -13.8 15.0 -28.4 29.7 -58.0 
  Engineering products 30.9 -55.8 -7.6 -8.8 -13.8 -10.5 
  Home textile 27.8 -3.9 38.4 -9.1 10.7 -19.6 
  Footwear 49.0 8.8 3.7 -13.6 10.2 -3.0 
  Others 54.6 -17.1 -18.9 -10.3 -2.0 -6.8 
Total exports 42.5 -1.6 6.0 -0.6 10.3 -11.7 
Source: Calculated from EPB (2009). 
 
A decomposition of the growth dynamics reveals that the rise in total exports (10.3%) was more than 
accounted for by a rise in volume (11.9%), whereas prices had somewhat declined on average (-1.6%) 
(Table 2). Thus, most of the export growth in 2008/09 was volume driven, and exporters had to cope 
with lower prices and lower profit margins. Indeed, anecdotal information suggests that a large number 
of exporters continued to export at lower prices, with a view to maintaining their relationships with 
importers in developed countries and with buying houses (mainly in the case of apparels).  
 
Table 2: Decomposition of Bangladeshi export growth dynamics, 2007/08-2009/10Q1 (%)  
 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10Q1 (Jul-Sep) 
Total export growth 15.9 10.3 -11.7 
 Volume index growth 14.1 11.9 - 8.4 
 Price index growth 1.8 -1.6 - 3.2 
Source: Compiled from EPB (2009). 
 
Performance of the export sector has had a concomitant impact on industrial production, particularly 
because export-oriented production accounts for a significant part of manufacturing sector GDP in 
Bangladesh. During 2008/09, the quantum index of production of medium- and large-scale 
manufacturing industries registered growth of 7.4%. Major primary product groups recorded relatively 
low production growth of 0.8%. However, higher growth of apparels meant that export-oriented 
manufacturing industry recorded a modest 10.6% growth during the same period (BBS, 2009a). 
                                                          
8 The effect of the base year’s performance (compared with the corresponding months of 2008) on export growth was also a 
contributing factor. 
9 The Wal-Mart effect refers to continued (even higher) demand for low-priced items during recession as some consumers tend 
to shift their demand to lower-end products in view of reduced earnings. 
 5 
Figure 2: Gradual slowdown of Bangladeshi export growth (value), Jul 2008-Sep 2009 (%) 
 
Source: Based on EPB (2009). 
 
The resilience of the export sector tapered away towards the last quarter of 2008/09, when overall 
exports declined by 0.6% (Figure 2). Lower demand led to an accumulation of inventories, and rising 
inventories led to a further slowdown in orders. Uncertainties about whether the recession would be 
‘L’, ‘U’ or ‘V’ shaped also added to lower business confidence. The slowdown in export earnings 
continued during the first quarter of 2009/10, when the lagged impact of the global downturn became 
more pronounced. Exports of manufactured products (in value terms) declined by a substantial 
amount, registering a fall of 11.7% during the first quarter of 2009/10 (y-o-y), underwritten primarily by 
a fall in exports of woven and knit RMG, both declining by 9.7%.10
 
 Exports of tea (-85.6%), agricultural 
products (-18.4%) and frozen foods (-37.9%) were also affected significantly. Only exports of 
electronics managed to record substantial positive growth, of 54.8%. All other major manufacturing 
items recorded a significant decline in exports in the first quarter of 2009/10. It is to be noted that, in 
the first quarter of 2009/10, the fall in export value (by 11.7%) was accounted for mainly by the decline 
in volume (8.4%) terms; however, average prices also decreased significantly compared with the 
corresponding period of the previous fiscal year (by 3.2%). 
October 2009 saw setbacks. Total exports registered 18.0% growth over October 2008 but, taking into 
consideration July-October 2009 (the first four months of 2009/10), total export earnings experienced a fall 
of 6.7% compared with the corresponding period of 2008/09; exports of apparels had declined by 5.7%. 
 
Table 3: Export growth in value of Bangladesh’s major commodities, Jan-Oct 2008 and 2009 (%) 
 2008 2009 
RMG 31.1 2.5 
 Woven RMG 25.4 1.4 
 RMG 36.7 3.5 
Non-RMG 22.6 -13.2 
 Raw jute -0.7 11.7 
 Tea 26.9 -62.9 
 Leather -6.6 -34.3 
 Jute goods -3.5 0.8 
 Frozen foods 16.1 -27.5 
 Chemical 46.2 -57.0 
 Engineering products -0.3 -2.0 
 Home textile 15.8 0.1 
 Footwear 36.9 -6.4 
Total exports 29.0 -1.2 
Source: Calculated from EPB (2009). 
                                                          
10 Table 1 provides further product-specific performance information. 
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Total export earnings during the first 10 months of 2008 (January-October) increased by 29% over the 
same period of 2007, and RMG exports posted 31.1% growth (Table 3). With the emergence of the 
global financial crisis, the same time period of 2009 saw total exports decline by 1.2%, compared with 
the corresponding period of 2008. Although exports of RMG products managed to maintain a marginal 
positive growth (2.5%), exports of tea, leather, frozen foods and chemicals decreased sharply. 
 
US imports of apparels (both knitwear and woven) from most other countries have decelerated during 
the crisis period. Estimations based on US International Trade Commission (USITC) data show that total 
apparel imports to the US declined by 13.5% during January-September of 2009, over the same period 
of 2008. Imports declined by 0.1% from China, 4.6% from Vietnam and 24.2% from Cambodia during 
this period. However, US imports of apparel items from Bangladesh increased by 1.8% over the period 
between January and September 2009 (Table 4).  
 
Table 4: Growth in US imports of apparel items (knit and woven) in Jan-Sep 2009 over Jan-Sep 
2008 (%)  
 Knit Woven Apparel (knit & woven) 
China 5.9 -4.5 -0.1 
Mexico -23.4 -14.1 -17.8 
Vietnam -0.5 -9.5 -4.6 
Indonesia 5.9 -14.9 -4.8 
India -4.1 -9.5 -7.3 
Bangladesh -5.6 4.5 1.8 
Honduras -21.3 -20.4 -21.1 
Cambodia -22.0 -28.4 -24.2 
Total -12.2 -14.8 -13.5 
Source: Computed from the USITC database. 
 
Shares of various competing countries in the US apparels market have also changed during the crisis 
period. China, the largest exporter in the US market, sustained and even managed to improve its share 
in the (shrinking) market during the recessionary period. China’s market share increased by more than 
5.0% in 2009 (data available up to September 2009) compared with 2007, the pre-crisis year. In the 
case of Bangladesh, market share of apparel items also increased, though marginally, by 1.5% in 2009 
from 2007 (Table 5). During the third quarter of 2009, China’s market share increased further, standing 
at 42.8%. Against this, Bangladesh’s share in the US market reduced to about 4.9%, testifying to the 
lagged response.  
 
Table 5: Value share and rank by country in US imports of apparel items (knit & woven), 2007-
2009 (%) 
Country 2007 2008 2009 (Jan-Sep) Ranking (2009) 
China 31.9 33.0 37.1 1 
Vietnam 5.7 7.1 7.7 2 
Indonesia 5.3 5.5 6.2 3 
Bangladesh 4.0 4.7 5.5 4 
Mexico 5.9 5.5 5.2 5 
India 4.3 4.3 4.8 6 
Honduras 3.4 3.6 3.2 7 
Cambodia 3.2 3.3 2.9 8 
Source: Computed from the USITC database. 
 
This gradual development has come from both weakened demand in external markets and also from 
some degree of erosion of Bangladesh’s competitiveness. If the top 14 RMG products of Bangladesh 
are considered, during September 2008 to September 2009, US imports from Bangladesh decreased 
by 13.2%, whereas exports of the same items from China to the US increased by about 22.0% over the 
same period.11
                                                          
11 These include eight woven items and six knit items. 
 Since March 2009, China’s exports (of the 14 RMG products mentioned above) to the US 
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have recovered considerably, whereas for Bangladesh export earnings have remained mostly 
unchanged (Figure 3). Withdrawal of the US quota restriction on imports from China in January 2009, 
coupled with China’s aggressive response to the global shock (e.g. raising tax rebates on lower-end 
export items, in addition to other export incentives), has contributed towards a revival of China’s 
exports to the US market. Unit price cuts by Chinese manufacturers may also have raised 
competitiveness and stimulated demand for China’s RMG products.12 Along with external factors, 
domestic supportive policies to stimulate demand have helped China’s export sector, particularly 
apparels.13
 
 
Figure 3: Imports by the US – Bangladesh’s major RMG export items vis-à-vis China, 2006-2009 
(US$ millions) 
 
Source: Computed from the USITC database.  
 
As in the case of the US market, in the European Union (EU) market China remained by far the leading 
source of apparel products.14 Indeed, China was able to increase its market share, while the market 
share of second-ranked Turkey has been on the decline in the recent past, if pre- and post-crisis 
periods are compared (Table 6). Despite China’s dominant role in the EU market, Bangladesh and India 
both managed to increase their market share in a shrinking market.15
 
 
Table 6: Share and rank by country in the EU-27 import of apparel items (knit and woven), 2007-
2009 (%) 
 2007 2008 2009 Rank 2009 
China  37.7 42.6 43.0 1 
Turkey 15.4 13.2 12.3 2 
Bangladesh 7.6 8.0 9.3 3 
India 6.6 6.6 8.0 4 
Tunisia 4.4 4.3 4.1 5 
Morocco 4.4 4.0 3.6 6 
Source: Computed from the Eurostat database 
                                                          
12 For the six knit products discussed above, China managed to reduce the respective price by about 22% (on average) in 
September 2009 compared with September 2008, whereas (on average) prices offered by Bangladesh increased by 2%. For 
the eight woven products, the price offered by China was about 14% lower in September 2009 compared with September 
2008. For some of these products (four out of eight), Bangladesh was also forced to follow China in reducing prices. 
13 The Chinese textile industry benefited from the introduction of a tax rebate and a declared 15% cash subsidy on exports. 
China also maintained a fixed exchange rate of the yuan against the US dollar. The Chinese yuan depreciated against the euro 
by 6.2% between January and November 2009. 
14 The analysis considers only extra-EU trade. 
15 58.5% of total apparel exports from Bangladesh were destined for the EU in 2008/09. 
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Exports of Chinese apparels to the EU, as indicated by mirror data, experienced a high degree of 
volatility. As is evident from Figure 4, where exports of Bangladesh’s top 15 apparel items are given in a 
comparative setting with China, the gap between Bangladesh and China widened between 2006 and 
2009 (July). Although Bangladesh is entitled to Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) facilities in the 
EU market, for the top seven knitwear products in the EU market it registered negative growth of 6.7% 
during April-July 2009 compared with the same period of 2008.16
 
 China registered growth of 6.4% for 
the same set of products during the same period. In the case of the top eight woven RMG products, 
during the first seven months of 2009 Bangladesh posted only 0.5% growth compared with the 
corresponding months of 2008, whereas China registered rather impressive growth of 7.1%.  
Figure 4: Imports by the EU-27 (monthly average by quarter) – Bangladesh’s major RMG export 
items vis-à-vis China, 2006-2009 (€ millions) 
 
Source: Computed from the Eurostat database.  
 
With regard to the near-term outlook for Bangladesh’s export performance, much will depend on the 
pace at which the developed economies recover, and whether Bangladesh can face the stiff 
competition from its competitors, which are trying to restructure their exports in view of the crisis to 
address the challenges and realise emerging opportunities. Entrepreneurs will have to try to increase 
the productivity of both labour and capital. For its part, GoB will need to create the supportive and 
conducive environment required for this, particularly through availability of power and infrastructure. 
One promising sign is that demand for apparels is on the rise, and Bangladeshi entrepreneurs have 
started to receive enhanced orders from buyers and major buying houses. However, the downward 
push on prices appears to have been sustained. As a result, it is unclear whether higher volumes of 
orders will result in higher export earnings. With regard to non-RMG products, the slump in export 
performance has continued unabated.  
 
2.2 Performance of remittance flows 
 
In recent times, Bangladesh has emerged as a major exporter of manpower, targeting particularly the 
labour-intensive sectors of the various developed and developing economies. Over the past two years 
(2007/08 and 2008/09), a record number of Bangladeshi workers, 1.6 million (BB, 2009a), have left 
the country in search of jobs abroad. Over the years, the contribution of remittances to Bangladesh’s 
economy in terms of GDP has increased significantly (from 4.0% in 2000/01 to 10.8% in 2008/09). If 
remittances through informal channels were taken into account, for which no official data are available, 
                                                          
16 Under the EU Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative, Bangladesh receives duty-free quota-free treatment for all its exports. 
Since average duty on apparels in the EU is about 12.1%, this allows Bangladesh to enjoy a considerable competitive edge vis-
à-vis China, which is not eligible for such preferential treatment. 
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this would be even higher. Setting aside the role of remittances in terms of beefing up Bangladesh’s 
forex coffers and enhancing its ability to import, remittances sent from overseas also play a crucial role 
in strengthening the social security of the family members of the remitters, who often come from low-
income households. 
 
In spite of the recession, unlike exports, remittance earnings have been on the rise in recent months, 
albeit with some fluctuations (Figure 5). Overall, remittances during 2008/09 were 22.4% higher 
compared with 2007/08. However, monthly growth (y-o-y) during 2008/09 shows a slower pace, 
particularly since January 2009. A reduction in the number of outward migrants during recent months 
could explain this slowdown. Nevertheless, remittance earnings during July-October of 2009/10 
($3,619.30 million) recorded 21.2% growth. This implies that a growth rate of only 4.1% would be 
required over the next eight months to achieve the remittance target set by GoB for 2009/10.17
 
 
Figure 5: Change in the flow of remittances in Bangladesh, Jul 2007-Sep 2009 
 
Note: The secondary axis represents the growth rate. 
Source: Compiled from BB (2009a). 
 
In contrast with in many other countries, performance of remittance flows has thus shown resilience in 
the face of the crisis. There are a number of explanations for this. First, annual outflow of workers is an 
insignificant part of the total stock of Bangladeshi workers working abroad (accounting for about 8% to 
9%). This limits the impact of the crisis on remittance inflows from lower outflows of migrant workers. 
Second, part of the increase in remittances inflows could be accounted for by terminal workers bringing 
back their savings. Third, as a consequence of the crisis on the global financial system, a number of 
migrants may have shifted their savings to their home country. Fourth, in recent years Bangladesh Bank 
(BB) has promoted the use of legal channels (banks, money exchanges and other formal institutions) to 
remit foreign currency to Bangladesh. At the same time, the cost of sending remittances has fallen.  
 
However, a disquieting development has emerged with regard to the falling number of workers leaving 
for abroad. As is evident from Figure 6, export of manpower from Bangladesh has been on a declining 
trend for some time now. During 2008/09, the number of persons going abroad for work was around 
                                                          
17 The target was set conservatively, at $10.6 billion, in view of the crisis (9.4% growth over the previous year). 
Macroeconomic performance targets are generally set in Bangladesh by keeping in line with historical trends rather than with 
strategic visions and policy options in mind. 
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0.65 million, recording a significant fall of -33.7% against 2007/08. The trend continued during the first 
two months of 2009/10, recording a fall of -46.5% (y-o-y).  
 
Figure 6: Trends in number of persons going abroad from Bangladesh, Jul 2007-Jul 2009 
 
Note: The secondary axis represents the growth rate. 
Source: Compiled from BB (2009a). 
 
The lion’s share is sent back from Middle Eastern countries (62.9% in 2007/08). The other two major 
sources are the US (17.4% in 2007/08) and the UK (11.3% in 2007/08). Available records show that, 
during the crisis-affected period, the share from the Middle East increased slightly, to 65.8% in 
2008/09, whereas the share of the US and the UK declined to 16.3% and 8.1%, respectively. Data on 
remittance inflows for the first four months of 2009/10 (July-October 2009) show a further decline in 
the share of the US (13.6%) but that the shares of the UK (8.1%) and the Middle East (64.5%) have 
remained rather steady. However, the number of workers is higher in the Middle East, where most 
workers enter the lower end of the job market; in the UK and the US, a significant number work as 
professionals or skilled workers and in the services sectors. 
 
Bangladeshi workers going abroad in 2009 were significantly fewer compared with the previous two 
years, mainly because some of the major destinations (including the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi 
Arabia, Malaysia and Singapore) were tending to be cautious with regard to allowing inward migration 
in the face of sluggish economic growth and lower demand for construction and other services. Initially, 
12,000 Bangladeshi workers were retrenched in Malaysia, and the Maldives halted hiring Bangladeshi 
workers. Sudan’s decision to retrench 20,000 Bangladeshi workers also contributed to Bangladesh’s 
woes. Realising the potential negative impact of such measures on the economy, GoB decided to 
conclude bilateral negotiations with some of these countries. Fortunately, countries such as Saudi 
Arabia and Malaysia have committed to not retrenching Bangladeshi workers and have allowed these 
workers to change jobs, or stay on even when they lose their jobs. With economic recovery, some of the 
traditional destination countries have indicated that imports of workers could rise again in the near 
future. In view of recent negotiations, the UAE is once again considering hiring workers from 
Bangladesh.18
 
 A recent initiative to send workers to Iraq may also contribute positively in this respect, 
although security concerns remain. 
The recent debt default by Dubai has sent shockwaves through financial markets. The governments of 
Dubai and Abu Dhabi have already given assurance that they will provide financial support to cover 
                                                          
18 During November 2009, the Prime Minister visited the UAE, where this commitment was made by the latter government. 
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working capital and interest expenses: Abu Dhabi has already provided $10 billion as an initial support 
measure. It remains to be seen how Dubai can manage and overcome the crisis, and whether or not 
manpower exports from Bangladesh are affected. 
 
The issue of returnee workers from abroad during the past 10 months has drawn significant attention 
from various quarters in Bangladesh. After the crisis started in mid-2008, Bangladesh’s major 
manpower importing partners, including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Malaysia and Singapore, resorted 
to various retrenchment measures, and in some instances imposed restrictions on issuance of new 
work visas. Malaysia initially announced cancellation of 55,000 new visas for Bangladeshi workers 
although it withdrew this order after successful negotiations at higher levels with GoB (see above). 
According to Rahman et al. (2009b), as many as 38,208 Bangladeshi workers returned from overseas 
during January-May 2009. Out of these, about 97% returned because of retrenchment and the rest 
because their visas had expired (Figure 7). Most of the retrenched workers were from the two major 
destination countries (about 36% from Saudi Arabia and 31% from the UAE). However, in the absence 
of historical data on returnee workers, no comparison is possible to separate out any usual returns. 
 
Figure 7: Number of Bangladeshi returnee migrants, Jan-May 2009 
 
Source: Rahman et al. (2009b).  
 
Latest data from the Bureau of Manpower, Employment and Training (BMET) suggest that, during the 
period June-October 2009, the number of Bangladeshi returnee workers declined to 23,000 (Figure 8). 
This is perhaps an indication of recovery in international job markets, particularly in the Middle East 
region. The rise of oil prices in international markets has played a positive role in this context. However, 
this information should be interpreted carefully, as one would expect normal (not crisis-related) return 
as well: as there are no reliable data on returnee migrants it is difficult to identify those returning as a 
result of the crisis as against ‘normal’ returnees. 
 
Figure 8: Number of returnee Bangladeshi migrants from abroad, Jun-Oct 2009 
 
Source: Data from BMET (2009). 
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Bangladeshi workers returning home since the beginning of the crisis belong to two groups: 1) those 
who had worked overseas for more than a year and 2) those who had stayed overseas for less than a 
year and had to return as a result of the crisis. Findings from Rahman et al. (2009b), based on FGDs 
with returnee migrants, reveal that the first group somehow managed to recover part of the cost 
incurred for visas and other expenses. The situation was different for those belonging to the second 
group who, in some instances, were unable to stay even for a month. These workers were found not 
only to have incurred serious financial losses as a result of their early return but also to be heavily 
indebted on account of the substantial loans that they had had to take in order to pay for travel and 
sponsorships, often at high interest rates. Some of these workers are currently unemployed; others are 
either working as day labourers or operating small businesses. 
 
Rahman et al. (2009b) further report that returnee migrant workers identified a number of problems 
that they faced when going aboard. These related to excessively high payments for visa processing, 
harassment by local recruiting agencies and their commission agents after their return, 
misinformation/false information with regard to the availability and nature of jobs abroad and 
harassment by outsourcing agencies working in importing countries. Because of the higher 
expenditures involved for a typical Bangladeshi worker (by more than three times) vis-à-vis those of 
neighbouring countries (e.g. India and Nepal), length of stay abroad, level of wages, timely payment of 
wages and opportunity for overtime were relatively more important factors for Bangladeshi workers. 
Rahman et al. (2009b) note that, according to these returnee migrants, withdrawal of the sponsorship 
system and allowing workers to work for different employers than just the one recruiting them in the 
first place could help workers stay abroad, bide their time during recession and recoup the money 
spent in going abroad. Returnees also complain that many of the Bangladeshi diplomatic missions 
located in the Middle East and Southeast Asia have not been adequately responsive to the needs of 
migrant workers. GoB needs to adopt a stricter monitoring mechanism to ensure that government 
institutions carry out their service mandate to non-resident Bangladeshis in an appropriate manner, 
particularly during times of financial crisis and economic turmoil. While some of these points noted 
here are general phenomena, indications are that they have become more frequent during the crisis.  
 
2.3 Import performance 
 
In recent years, imports by Bangladesh have tended to experience quite robust growth. Particularly 
during 2007/08, import payments marked a 25.7% growth, mainly because of the then high global 
commodity prices (Table 7). However, import of capital machineries decelerated by 14.3% in this 
period, owing to a slackening of investment demand in the country.  
 
Table 7: Import payment growth (value) in Bangladesh, 2000/01-2009/10 (%) 
 Growth  
2000/03 (average) 10.2 
2004/07 (average) 20.5 
2007/08 25.7 
2008/09 4.8 
2009/10 (Jul-Sep) -19.0 
Source: Calculated from BB (2009b). 
 
During the first two quarters of 2008/09, total import payments posted 37.7% and 11.8% growth, 
respectively, compared with the corresponding periods of the preceding fiscal year (Table 8). But, to a 
significant extent, this significant growth was accounted for by high growth in imports of crude and 
refined petroleum products and fertiliser. A sharp fall in the prices of these items in the international 
market during the later parts of the year resulted in a gradual slowdown in import payment growth. 
During the third and fourth quarters, import payments declined by 4.4% and 16.6%, respectively. At the 
end of the last fiscal year (2008/09), growth of aggregate import payments came down to 4.8%, 
compared with 25.8% in 2007/08. With the deepening of the economic crisis, the manufacturing 
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sector, particularly export-oriented industries, was adversely affected (which is reflected by the 
downward import trend of textile and articles thereof). 
 
Table 8: Recent import growth (value) of major commodities in Bangladesh, 2007/08-2009/10Q1 
(%) 
 2007/ 
08  
2008/ 
09 
2008/ 09 
Q1 
(Jul-Sep 
2008) 
2008/ 09 
Q2 (Oct-
Dec 
2008) 
2008/ 09 
Q3 (Jan-
Mar 
2009) 
2008/ 09 
Q4 (Apr- 
Jun 2009) 
2009/ 10 
Q1 
(Jul-Sep 
2009) 
Food grain 141.4 -37.4 -44.6 -29.0 -44.2 -23.4 -23.8 
Milk and dairy 
products 
64.9 -30.2 -31.6 -28.9 -42.4 -6.9 -34.2 
Edible oil 71.7 -13.8 8.2 -11.4 -8.1 -39.9 19.3 
Textile and articles 
thereof (RMG inputs) 
-0.6 11.2 11.3 18.0 12.7 3.8 -11.7 
Iron and steel 18.9 27.7 38.8 18.8 50.0 9.2 -14.8 
Capital goods -14.3 -13.6 -10.8 -8.2 -13.0 -22.3 -4.1 
Others 29.0 10.0 60.7 20.7 -3.5 -19.3 -23.5 
Total imports 25.8 4.8 37.7 11.8 -4.4 -16.6 -19.0 
Source: Calculated from BB (2009a). 
 
During the first quarter of 2009/10, aggregate import payments declined by 19.0%. Imports of capital 
machineries are yet to recover from the earlier shock posed by falling global demand and bottlenecks 
in domestic investment. Imports of textiles and articles thereof decelerated by 4.9%: this category 
relates to fabrics for RMG production; perhaps the negative growth indicates lower orders being placed 
during the crisis period. However, lower import payments have kept the balance of payments situation 
at a comfortable level. Combined with record remittance flows, this has helped Bangladesh to 
accumulate a record high level of foreign exchange reserves.19 With global commodity prices rising, 
import payments are projected to rise in the near future.20
 
 During the first two months of 2009/10, 
opening of import L/Cs registered 3.3% growth, indicating a revival in import demand. The growth in 
L/C opening of capital machineries has brought some promise, registering 8.7% growth in the 
abovementioned period. However, unless investment and export trends recover, imports are likely to 
register lower growth.  
2.4 Revenue earnings 
 
The global financial crisis has had concomitant implications for domestic resource mobilisation in 
Bangladesh, in a number of ways. First, Bangladesh’s revenue is highly dependent on import duties.21
 
 
With the onslaught of the financial crisis and the consequent decline in global demand, global 
commodity prices have experienced a significant fall. Combined with the depressed investment 
situation and lower domestic import demand (both in value terms and, in many instances, in volume 
terms), revenue from import-related duties has emerged as the major fiscal transmission channel of the 
global financial crisis. Second, deceleration in economic activities, particularly in export-oriented 
industries, has meant lower scope for direct tax collection at that level. Third, apprehension regarding a 
slowdown in foreign resource flows has highlighted the need to generate additional resources at 
domestic levels to finance the developmental budget. Finally, the need for higher public expenditure to 
service the stimulus package and public investment in social safety nets has underlined the need for 
higher revenue collection to maintain the fiscal balance. The need for countercyclical measures was a 
reality, but GoB attempted also to go for greater resource generation at domestic levels to reduce the 
expected higher deficit. 
                                                          
19 On 10 November 2009, foreign exchange reserves crossed the $10 billion mark for the first time in the country’s history. 
20 The oil price (per barrel) has been hovering around the $80 mark in recent times. 
21 Import-related duties account for 29.2% of total domestic revenue in the budget for 2009/10. 
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Revenues at the import stage mostly suffered from lower collection of import duties in 2008/09. 
Against a target of Tk10,862 crore ($1551.7 million), Tk9351.9 crore worth ($1336.0 million) of import 
duties was collected. This implies a shortfall of Tk1501 crore ($215.7 million), posting a negative growth 
of -2.6% over the matching figure of 2007/08 (Table 9). The budget aimed for 13.1% higher import duty 
collection in 2008/09 over 2007/08, mostly from the anticipated global price recovery. Compared with 
import duties, revenues from VAT (import) suffered less from falling prices; a growth of 8.2% was 
recorded, although this also was lower than the target of 12.6%. VAT (import) collection missed its 
target by Tk375.1 crore ($53.6 million). On the other hand, supplementary duty (import) posted 
relatively high growth of 32.9%, surpassing its target by Tk219.4 crore ($31.3 million).22
 
 
Table 9: Import-related revenue collection in Bangladesh, 2008 and 2009 (%) 
  Actual growth 2007/08 Target growth 2008/09 Actual growth 2008/09 
Import total 26.7 13.5 5.2 
Import duty 17.7 13.1 -2.6 
VAT import 34.5 12.6 8.2 
Supplementary import 46.6 20.4 32.9 
Source: Calculated from NBR (2009a). 
 
Revenue mobilisation from import sources has been on the slide for some time now (Figure 9). During 
July-September of 2009 (2009/10), revenue earnings of the government from import-related duties 
declined (-2.7%) compared with the corresponding period of 20008 (2008/09). VAT (import) recorded -
8.7% growth, and import duties also decreased (-2.3%). Supplementary duty achieved impressive 
20.3% growth, which somewhat offset the decline of income from other sources. This owed to the 
proposed new duty structure announced in the budget for 2009/10.23
 
  
Figure 9: Slowdown in import duty collection in Bangladesh, Jul 2009-Sep 2010 (%)  
Source: NBR (2009b). 
 
The depressed global economic situation has led to lower domestic investment, eventually leading to 
lower than projected GDP growth in 2008/09; against targeted growth of 6.5%, 5.9% growth was 
achieved. Bhattacharya et al. (2009) indicate that domestic revenue mobilisation in Bangladesh is 
dependent to a significant extent on changes in the level of per capita income. The adverse impact on 
income growth affected domestic resource mobilisation negatively. 
 
                                                          
22 Supplementary duty is additional to customs duty and VAT, imposed at local and import stages under the VAT Act 1991. The 
tax base for VAT stands as follows. For import stage, customs assessable value + customs duty + supplementary duty. For 
domestic/local stage, 1) goods (manufacturing): [production cost + profit and commission (if any) + supplementary duty (if 
any)]; 2) services: [total receipts excluding VAT but including supplementary duty (if any)]. 
23 The details of the new duty structure are discussed in Section 3. 
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The global financial crisis has once again reinforced the need for greater emphasis on direct taxes as a 
source of domestic revenue mobilisation in Bangladesh. As of now, direct taxes account for only 21% of 
total revenue earnings (2008/09). At the same time, the crisis has also exposed the long-standing 
structural weaknesses of revenue mobilisation in Bangladesh. It is necessary now for the government 
not only to widen and deepen the domestic tax base, but also to reemphasise the need for institution-
strengthening initiatives to ensure higher and more effective revenue effort. 
 
2.5 Official development assistance  
 
The role of ODA has been on the decline over the past decade. However, ODA still finances about one-
third of the total fiscal deficit of Bangladesh (the projected share of net foreign financing in the budget 
for 2009/10 is 29.7%). In 2008/09, a total amount of $1726.9 million in aid was disbursed. This was 
approximately $335 million (15%) less than the amount disbursed over the previous fiscal year. Net 
receipts of foreign aid during 2008/09 decreased to $1085.91 million, against $1475.52 million in 
2007/08 (-25.7%). The figures for July-August 2009/10 are also on the downside, indicating a decline (-
90.3%) in net foreign aid disbursement in Bangladesh, with gross disbursement falling substantially 
from $315.2 million in 2008/09 (July-August) to $22.3 million in 2009/10 (July-August). Since most of 
the aid is project oriented, flows are often dictated by project cycles. Thus, aid tends to be volatile 
across months, and this declining trend should be looked at with some caution. 
 
There was an expectation in Bangladesh that earlier aid commitments would hold and, at the same 
time, that new pledges in view of the growing needs in crisis-driven developing economies would also 
be made available. Indeed, a number of global initiatives were put in place in view of the crisis. 
However, Bangladesh is yet to receive any significant aid to address the consequences of the crisis. An 
exception has been the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) allocation by the IMF. On 1 September 2009, 
Bangladesh received $735 million from the G-20-supported general allocation (total equivalent to $250 
billion to boost global liquidity) from the IMF, which has been made available to all 186 IMF members. 
This fund has helped Bangladesh boost its foreign exchange reserves. However, it is pertinent to 
mention here that the balance of payments situation of Bangladesh was quite comfortable even before 
this disbursement; during July-August 2009 the current account surplus was $1304 million. 
On the other hand, enhanced aid commitments are evident. Two separate deals with the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) are expected to provide $745 million as budgetary support credit and $130 
million as soft loans to help improve public and environmental health services in large cities. The ADB 
earlier announced that it was going to increase its annual assistance package to Bangladesh by 33%, 
to $800 million annually during 2009/11. The ADB is also considering GoB’s request for $500 million in 
aid from its special fund to tackle the adverse impacts of the global financial crisis. The ADB may also 
provide a further $76 million to help support small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Meanwhile, 
the World Bank has recently approved $130 million-worth of credit to increase the country’s access to 
electricity through installation of affordable solar home systems in rural areas, and has also decided to 
increase aid to Bangladesh by 20%, to $1.0 billion per annum over the next three years. The overall 
commitment of the World Bank is estimated to be $1096.9 million. The government is also negotiating 
$4.7 billion of assistance in the form of project aid with the Chinese government, which is expected to 
be realised over the next few years if an agreement is reached. However, the recent dispute with the 
World Bank and ADB regarding the Public Procurement Regulations (PPR) has generated doubts with 
regard to the availability of such loans. 
 
It is to be noted that the major share of aid flows to Bangladesh comes as project aid to finance various 
development projects under the country’s Annual Development Programme (ADP). As a result, aid 
disbursement is related directly to the implementation status of ADP projects. Actual disbursement will 
depend more on Bangladesh’s capacity to absorb the aid rather than on the availability of aid itself. 
During the first three months of 2009/10, only 9% of project aid allocations had been utilised, which is 
in tune with historical trends. Slow implementation of donor-funded ADP projects in the current fiscal 
year has yet again resulted in lower aid disbursement thus far this year. In view of the need to generate 
more local demand through enhanced economic activities, it is important that both quality and 
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quantity of aid disbursement and ADP implementation be significantly improved. In order to tackle the 
potential deceleration in GDP growth as a consequence of the global economic contraction, GoB ought 
to consider foreign financing as an important source, given its non-inflationary nature, and also, more 
crucially, to minimise the ‘crowding-out’ effect of borrowing from domestic sources. 
 
2.6 Foreign direct investment and portfolio investment  
 
FDI inflow to Bangladesh is typically concentrated in a few sectors (e.g. telecommunications, banking, 
power, gas and petroleum, textiles and wearing apparel). Table 10 provides some background 
information on sources of FDI inflow to Bangladesh and its sectoral composition. 
 
Table 10: FDI in Bangladesh, 2005-2008 (US$ millions) 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 
 Total FDI inflows  845.3 792.5 666.4 1086.3 
Sector 
Telecommunications 278.8  346.5  201.9  641.4  
Banking  117.8  117.7  80.0  141.8  
Gas and petroleum  181.1  187.1  190.2  73.3  
Textiles and wearing apparel  96.5  70.1  102.4  126.4  
Power  27.2  21.1  25.8  27.8  
Other 143.9  50.0  66.2  75.8  
Source 
Egypt  48.4 105.4 75.2 373.4 
 UK  152.8 70.5 142.6 130.6 
 UAE  55.5 88.0 83.3 102.2 
 Switzerland  2.3 2.8 13.4 69.3 
 Singapore  97.5 35.9 10.7 32.3 
 US  141.8 175.7 120.4 40.9 
 South Korea  29.9 53.9 27.7 44.6 
 Hong Kong China  53.1 47.4 55.5 39.9 
 Netherlands  15.4 13.0 18.7 31.7 
 Pakistan  25.5 5.1 3.5 12.5 
 Other  223.2 194.8 115.7 209.0 
Source: BB (2009d). 
 
Net FDI flows to Bangladesh increased, albeit marginally, to $941 million in 2008/09 (Table 11). 
However, it needs to be kept in mind that FDI in Bangladesh has always been rather low compared with 
in its South Asian neighbours, accounting for only about 4.4% of total investment.  
 
Net FDI inflows of $126 million during the first two months of 2009/10 were considerably lower (by 
37.3%) than in the corresponding period of the previous fiscal year. However, lower inflows of FDI 
during recent months are perceived to be the result of a recent power crisis and infrastructural 
constraints rather than a reflection of a lack of availability of sources. 
 
Table 11: FDI and PFI in Bangladesh, 2007/08-2009/10 (US$ millions) 
 2007/08 2008/09 2008/09 Jul-Aug 2009/10 Jul-Aug 
Net FDI  748 941 201 126 
Net PFI  47 -159 8 -25 
Source: BB (2009b). 
 
As major stock indices around the world reeled from the impact of the global financial crisis, foreign 
investors began to withdraw their PFI from Bangladesh’s stock market. In 2008/09, $159 million-worth 
of PFI was withdrawn, almost equivalent to the total amount of PFI inflow ($154 million) to Bangladesh 
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in 2006/07 and 2007/08 combined.24
 
 It appears that, in the short term, the negative impacts of the 
financial and economic crises on foreign investments will continue (CPD, 2009).  
2.7 Labour market 
 
The prolonged recession and the consequent economic downturn have resulted in considerable 
adverse implications for the employment and labour markets of most economies. In view of the global 
financial crisis, Rahman et al. (2009b) estimate the employment situation of Bangladesh and its 
implications on the domestic job market.25 The resilience of Bangladesh’s economy during 2008/09 
contributed towards containing the adverse impacts on Bangladesh’s employment situation. Relatively 
high growth of the agriculture sector had a positive impact from the labour absorption perspective. 
Growth of employment opportunities in the industrial sector is expected to slow down; only 0.4 million 
job opportunities are expected to be created in 2008/09. Moreover, weakening manpower exports 
would mean an increase in the domestic labour supply by an additional 0.8 million over the 2008/10 
period. Considering these factors, the unemployment rate was estimated to be about 3.6% in 2008/09 
(Table 12).26
 
 However, with a possible downward revision of GDP growth, the composition of the labour 
force in different sectors and the rate of unemployment may need to be reviewed further. 
Table 12: Employment and labour market of Bangladesh, 2005/06-2009/10 (proj.) (millions)  
 2005/06 2007/08 (est.) 2008/09 (est.) 2009/10 (proj.) 
Agriculture 22.8 24.1 25.0 25.6 
Industry 6.9 7.6 7.9 8.3 
Service 17.7 19.5 20.4 21.3 
Total employment 47.4 51.2 53.3 55.2 
Labour force 49.5 53.1 55.2 57.3 
Unemployment rate (%) 4.3 3.6 3.6 3.7 
Source: Rahman et al. (2009b). 
 
The GDP growth target for 2009/10 has been set at 5.5%. If the economy does not experience much 
restructuring and change, total employment is expected to be 55.2 million in 2009/10; 25.6 million in 
the agriculture sector and 21.3 million in services. Additional employment in industry is projected to be 
lower: 0.4 million additional workers are expected to be employed in 2009/10. According to the 
projection, the unemployment rate will marginally increase to 3.7% in 2009/10. However, since 
agriculture in Bangladesh is characterised by a higher level of underemployment (i.e. lower working 
hours), the real employment situation of the economy may be worse than what the figures in Table 12 
would suggest.27 The concern here is that a large part of this newly absorbed labour force in this sector 
would work at less than the optimum level, which would increase underemployment in agriculture. The 
declining trend in underemployment visible since 2002 would possibly slow down in 2009/10.28
 
 This 
indicates that global recession may not impose rapid job cuts, as experienced by many developed 
countries, but would entail adverse implications for labour market composition in Bangladesh.  
FGDs with entrepreneurs from various export-oriented industries (Rahman et al., 2009b) suggest that a 
large number of entrepreneurs have taken various cost-cutting measures in view of the adverse impact 
                                                          
24 Stock markets of Bangladesh being largely isolated from the global economy (only about 2% of the market capital is 
sourced from foreign capital), the global crisis has had little, if not zero, effect on capital market developments. 
25 It is important to note here that the study mentioned a number of underlying assumptions in carrying out the estimation. 
First, the projection assumes that the relationship between employment and output remains consistent over the medium term. 
Second, structural changes within industries are adjusted for broad sectors in the medium term. Finally, it is assumed that no 
change in production technology takes place during the period under consideration. 
26 This is a low figure by any standard. However, there is a great deal of debate in Bangladesh with regard to the definition of 
unemployment. If underemployment is included, the figure would be much higher, at 28.7%. 
27 The average weekly working hours (according to BBS, 2008) in modern sectors varies between 50 and 60 hours, whereas in 
agriculture it varies between 37 and 54 hours. 
28 Underemployment in 2005-2006 decreased to 24.5%, from 37.6% in 2002-2003 (BBS, 2008). 
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of the crisis (Table 13). Although retrenchment of workers was not evident from the information 
provided, a number of entrepreneurs mentioned adopting such cost-cutting measures as increasing 
working hours, reduction of fringe benefits, reduction of firm’s capacity utilisation or even shutting 
down of some production units. Entrepreneurs with multiple units shut down some of them when order 
volumes were not forthcoming. Over the past several years, in view of high growth rates, many apparels 
entrepreneurs have gone for considerable capacity building and expansion. This excess capacity has 
remained idle, with consequent adverse effects on current employment and potential recruitment. A 
large segment of sample entrepreneurs indicated that, if demand for their outputs reduces further, they 
may have to intensify cost/labour reduction measures. Thus, the demand slump could have further 
adverse consequences for the labour market. Moreover, in industries that pay workers according to 
production,29 lower export demand may not necessarily result in a job cut or reduction of wages, but 
still can reduce the take-home pay of a worker.30
 
  
Table 13: Various adjustment measures considered by sample Bangladeshi entrepreneurs in 
view of crisis (% of respondents)  
 Measures taken because 
of the crisis  
If recession deepens, possible 
measures to be taken  
Laying off workers 8.3 11.1 
Wage cut 0.0 3.7 
Increasing working hours 4.2 6.5 
Reduction of workers’ fringe benefits 5.6 10.2 
Reducing profit margin 29.2 25.0 
Reducing firm’s capacity utilisation 5.6 12.0 
Closing down of production units 5.6 11.1 
None 41.7 20.4 
Source: Rahman et al. (2009b). 
 
The available evidence does not allude to the large number of RMG factories being shut down as a 
result of the crisis. FGDs with garments owners revealed that, among 4939 RMG factories, 270 were 
listed as ‘sick’ prior to the global recession and 100 garment factories were put at risk as a result of the 
adverse impacts of the global recession. However, it was also mentioned that 149 RMG factories 
entered the industry during this period. As growth in the RMG sector is volume driven, the 
overwhelming majority of the 2 million workers in this sector have, thus far, been spared the worst 
consequences of the crisis. However, with apparels exports slowing down considerably in recent 
months, this could have knock-on effects on employment and also on labour absorption capacity in the 
RMG sector, and could perhaps result in retrenchment in some cases. The Bangladesh Garments 
Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA) has recently claimed that at least 25-30,000 workers 
have faced job losses over the past eight months. Factory owners reported during FGDs that fresh 
recruitment of workers has slowed down significantly since mid-2008. There is demand for skilled 
labour, but willingness to recruit new workers and provide them with on-the-job training has suffered.  
 
On the other hand, workers expressed willingness to work at a reduced wage rate for a temporary 
period rather than face retrenchment. Many employers also seemed to be considering the option of 
providing a low wage instead of retrenchment. However, evidence suggests that this may be difficult to 
implement at factory level, and a FGD with worker leaders did not indicate that wages had been 
lowered. Layoffs have not been uncommon and a lack of appropriate exit regulations has complicated 
matters.31
 
 It is evident that, in many cases, reduced overtime, underutilisation of production capacity 
and reduction of working hours, especially in textiles, jute and frozen food industries, have led to a 
lower take-home salary. Occasional labour unrests have also been reported as a result of reduced 
operations although, to date, most factories have managed to address the emerging difficulties. 
                                                          
29 Piece rate is more prevalent in the sweater subsector of the knitwear industries. 
30 For example, the sweater-making factories set the wage of a worker according to pieces manufactured. 
31 For example, Bangladesh does not have a bankruptcy law. 
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2.8 Poverty situation 
 
There is a general acceptance that the crisis has had an adverse impact on the global poverty scenario. 
According to Chen and Ravallion (2009), the financial collapse, combined with the food and fuel crises, 
was likely to drive an additional 53-64 million people below the poverty line in 2009,32
 
 although they 
admit that ‘the estimates for any individual country could be widely off the mark in some cases’.  
Bangladesh has achieved remarkable progress in reducing poverty in the recent past: the proportion of 
people below the poverty line decreased by one percentage point in the 1990s and almost two between 
2000 and 2005, down to around 40%. Since no Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES) has 
been conducted in Bangladesh since 2005, it is difficult to produce reliable estimates about current 
poverty levels or the impact of the crisis on the poverty situation in the country. It would be safe to 
argue that poverty continued to decline between 2005 and 2007, in keeping with past trends, with a 
reversal of the trend in 2008 because of the subsequent commodity price hike, particularly of rice. 
According to World Bank estimates, the proportion of people living below the poverty line, expected to 
drop from 40% to 32% between 2005 and 2008, was likely to be about 38% (World Bank, 2008). Other 
estimates put the figure at much higher levels (Rahman et al., 2008). However, this refers to the pre-
crisis period. The World Bank (2009a) predicts that, as a result of the global financial crisis, 2.4 million 
people in Bangladesh will be unable to cross the poverty threshold at the end of 2009/10. A lower 
number of people going abroad as migrant workers and a slowdown of growth in export-oriented 
sectors were said to be likely to have adverse implications for poverty reduction in Bangladesh in 2009. 
 
In 2008/09, the national output of Bangladesh increased by 5.9%, while final consumption 
expenditure by households (in real terms) recorded a 6.0% growth over the previous fiscal year. 
Agriculture attained an impressive 4.6% growth during this period. With the majority of the population 
making their livelihood from agriculture, poverty impacts during the crisis period could thus be limited. 
Hopes of better agricultural production in 2009/10, if realised, would also provide some shield for the 
majority of the poor in terms of food security. The fall in commodity prices in the domestic market, 
influenced by the crisis-induced price slide in global commodity markets, has also been of benefit with 
regard to the real incomes of the poor. With continuing robust remittance inflows, households 
dependent on such finances have not been hard done by the crisis as yet. At the same time, absence of 
any evidence of large-scale labour retrenchment from the industrial sector also indicates limited impact 
of the crisis on the poverty situation. In view of the crisis, the growth projection for 2009/10 has been 
set at 5.5% (lower than the 6.2% and 5.9% in 2007/08 and 2008/09, respectively). 
 
However, the slowdown in economic growth, declining exports and sluggish investment in recent times 
could lead to a reduced pace of poverty reduction in 2010. The slowdown indicates lower opportunities 
for new job creation and fewer opportunities for overtime work. All of these have bearings on the 
poverty reduction performance of Bangladesh. With the rise in global commodity prices, particularly of 
food prices in the global market, much will depend on Bangladesh’s ability to increase domestic food 
grains production from the perspective of poverty reduction.  
                                                          
32 Based on estimates of people living on less than $2 a day and $1.25 a day, respectively. 
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3. The global financial crisis and Bangladesh’s policy stance 
 
As a quick response to the global crisis, in September 2008 the BB set up a Forex Investment 
Committee to monitor forex reserves held abroad. The BB withdrew about 90% of its total investment 
from international banks that were perceived to be at risk. It also advised the commercial banks of the 
country to be watchful about such investments. At the initial stage, this quick move helped avert the 
adverse impacts of the global financial crisis on the country’s foreign exchange reserves. As the global 
crisis spread, GoB came up with various direct and indirect policy support measures aimed at 
safeguarding domestic industries, sustaining exports and protecting the poor and the marginalised 
segments of society. These policy measures to mitigate the adverse consequences of the crisis 
consisted of 1) direct policy support and 2) macroeconomic policy stances for economy-wide positive 
effects.  
 
3.1 Direct support measures 
 
3.1.1 The first stimulus package 
In order to address the adverse affects of the global financial crisis, GoB declared a stimulus package 
of Tk3420 crore ($488.6 million) in April 2009. The fund, meant to be used over the last quarter of 
2008/09, allocated an additional Tk450 crore ($6.4 million) in cash subsidies (a total of Tk1500 crore 
or $21.4 million) for export industries most affected by the crisis.33
 
 Of the rest, Tk1500 crore ($21.4 
million) was allocated for agriculture, Tk600 crore ($8.6 million) for the power sector, Tk500 crore ($7.1 
million) for recapitalisation of agriculture loans and Tk374 crore ($5.3 million) for social safety net 
programmes. The first stimulus package also put more money into the SME Fund, whose capital was 
raised from Tk500 crore ($71.4 million) to Tk600 crore ($85.7 million) (MoF, 2009a).  
According to the package, cash incentives (based on actual export value) for jute and jute products 
were set to rise to 10%, from the previous rate of 7.5%, leather and leather goods to 17.5% from 15% 
and frozen foods and other fish exports to 12.5% from 10%. This was in line with the fact that exports of 
primary products suffered the most from the global crisis. Procedures for disbursement of funds were 
also simplified. Presumptive payment of 70% of the claim was proposed to be made available 
immediately, with the settlement of the rest of the claim to be paid after subsequent audit scrutiny. 
 
Available information shows that, as of September 2009, Tk995 crore ($14.2 million) in cash incentives 
has been disbursed, in two instalments. An amount of Tk245 crore ($35.0 million) was paid out in the 
first instalment, with the remaining Tk750 crore ($107.1 million) disbursed in the second phase. The 
increased cash subsidies could not deter the decline in exports in the sectors in question, but were 
perhaps helpful in reducing their difficulties at a time of falling demand and falling prices with 
consequent implications for profitability. 
 
GoB’s response came in for some criticism, since RMG exporters complained that they were left out 
from the benefits of the stimulus package. The apparently contradictory picture of volume-driven good 
apparels performance and falling profit margins gave rise to some tension between the government 
(which was comforted by good overall export earnings) and businesses, mainly the dominant apparels 
entrepreneurs (who were complaining about increasing competitive pressure). Complaints about 
government complacence gathered strength in September 2009, when exports of apparels experienced 
                                                          
33 Cash incentives for 13 export sectors (jute goods; leather and leather products; shrimp and other fish products; local 
fabrics; products made of hoogla, straw, coir or sugar cane; agriculture and agricultural processed products including 
vegetables and fruits; potatoes; bicycles; crushed bone; hatching eggs and day old chicks; light engineering products; liquid 
glucose (only for economic processing zone (EPZ)); halal meat) were already in place for 2008/09. Three sectors (jute goods, 
leather products and frozen shrimp and other fishes) were selected for additional allocation in the stimulus package against 
their exports during April 2009 to June 2009. 
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a 27% dip compared with the corresponding month of the previous year. The stimulus package 
announced in October 2009 was thus more of a reactive one.  
 
3.1.2 The second stimulus package 
Provision of Tk5000 crore ($714.3 million) was made in the budget for 2009/10 as part of a second 
stimulus package. While details on the new package were not unveiled, it was announced that it would 
help service the incentives and policies set forth in the first package. Not much information is available 
on the implementation status of the second package. However, according to recent newspaper reports, 
the package contains an allocation of Tk3046 crore ($435.1 million) as cash subsidies to affected 
exporters, out of which Tk1311 crore ($187.3 million) has already been released. 
 
3.1.3 The third stimulus package 
The government has recently announced a third stimulus package, focusing mostly on the apparels 
sector. The following provisions are included: 
1. Renewal fee (1 November 2009 to 30 June 2009) for captive generators to be used in the 
apparels sector will be paid out. 
2. Rescheduling of overdue loans in the apparels sector without down payment will be extended 
from 31 October 2009 to 30 June 2010. The rate of interest will be reduced from 13% to 10%. 
3. Payments time for loans defaulted on during the extension period will be increased on the basis 
of the bank–customer relationship at the prevailing market interest rate. 
4. Cash incentives (based on actual export value) at the rate of 5% for exporters to new markets 
(markets other than the US, Canada and the EU) will be provided in the first year, 4% in the 
second year and 2% in the third year. The Bangladesh Textile Mills Association (BTMA) will 
receive this particular benefit for any markets for export of yarn. 
5. Providing forward exchange booking facilities to home textiles for foreign exchange 
transactions in foreign currencies other than the US dollar.  
6. SMEs in the apparels sector that export up to $3.5 million in 2009/10 may be considered for 
‘special incentives’. Bangladesh Knitwear Manufacturers & Exporters Association (BKMEA) and 
BGMEA are to provide details (name, owner and actual exports) of such industries to the 
committee. BKMEA has submitted its information; BGMEA is yet to do so. The following 
recommendations have been accepted by the committee: 
a. If actual exports in 2009/10 are higher than in 2008/09, a 5% cash incentive will be 
provided on the additional value of exports.34
b. SMEs that do not own captive generators or diesel-run generators will receive a subsidy of 
10% on their electricity usage until 30 June 2010. 
 
c. Only those industries that have not rescheduled their loans will be eligible for the 
abovementioned incentives. 
d. It must be ensured that no SMEs are under the ownership of any larger industries. 
e. The government will decide on cash incentives after it receives the accurate information. 
7. The L/C advising charge, L/C amendment and transfer fees will be reduced to Tk750 ($10.7) 
from Tk1000 ($14.3). Commission on L/C opening will be reduced from 0.60% to 0.50% (three 
months). The L/C confirmation fee will be decreased to 0.20% from 0.25%. A ceiling of 0.15% is 
to be imposed on commission on import negotiation and collection (BB, 2009c). 
8. The limit of the Export Development Fund (EDF) will be raised from $1.5 million to $10 million by 
combining the resources of three commercial banks; the interest rate to be charged will be 
LIBOR + 2.5%. 
9. BTMA members will be eligible for EDF loans from their respective banks at LIBOR + 2.5% on the 
import value of raw materials for yarn production (cotton and other fibres). This facility will be 
provided on the value of yarn imported in previous years (maximum one year) or $10 million 
(whichever is less). 
                                                          
34 However, the related business associations (BGMEA and BKMEA) demanded a revision of this provision and requested that 
the government relax the conditionalities. Indeed, the original suggestion from the Working Group was to provide a cash 
incentive of 5% on up to 10% additional exports (over 2008/09) by small and medium-sized RMG units. 
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10. GoB will provide Tk300 crore ($42.9 million) as seed money to create a Contributory Fund with 
the objective of tackling the adverse effects of the global financial crisis on the exports of textile 
and apparels. Textile and apparels industry owners will contribute 0.1% of their export value 
(fob) from January 2010 to June 2010 and 0.2% of export value from July 2010. 
11. The contract for the National Institute of Textile Training, Research and Design (NITRAD) has 
been modified: a) The government will bear all expenses for the first year; b) the government 
will contribute 60% of the expenses incurred in the second year; c) for the next three years 50% 
of expenses will be borne by the government; and d) BTMA will take over the responsibilities of 
NITRAD from the sixth year onwards. 
 
The third stimulus package also includes some benefits for the shipbuilding and crust leather 
industries: a 5% cash incentive to promote exports to each industry. 
 
3.2 Indirect measures: Macroeconomic policy stances 
 
3.2.1 Exchange rate management 
Over the recent past, Bangladesh has pursued a policy of keeping the exchange rate stable vis-à-vis the 
US dollar, even during the crisis period. The BB has periodically been purchasing (and selling) US 
dollars from the open market to keep the Tk-US$ exchange rate stable.35 However, the weakening US 
dollar against major currencies such as the euro, the Japanese yen and the Indian rupee throughout 
2009, with the taka remaining stable against the dollar, has implied some depreciation of the taka 
against those currencies. Between 1 January and 11 November 2009, the taka depreciated by 6.3% 
against the euro, 5.4% against rupee and 0.2% against the yen, and appreciated only marginally 
against the US dollar, by 0.3% (Figure 10).36
 
 
Figure 10: Movement of the taka against major currencies, Jan-Nov 2009 
 
Source: www.oanda.com. 
 
                                                          
35 They have been successful – the Tk-US$ exchange rate has remained about the same, at 68.8 over the past two years. 
36 China, the major competitor of Bangladesh in EU and US markets (particularly for RMG), kept its currency pegged against 
the US dollar. Consequently, the yuan depreciated by 6.2% against the euro. Sri Lanka also announced ‘exchange rate 
support’ in its stimulus package.  
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In the early months of 2009 (January-March), Bangladeshi exporters to the EU suffered because of taka 
appreciation against the euro.37
 
 However, later on, when the euro appreciated against a weak dollar, 
Bangladeshi exporters reaped some benefit. Weak demand for US dollars in Bangladesh (from slower 
imports as against robust remittance inflows) perhaps led to some appreciation of the taka against the 
dollar supply underwritten by rising export earnings. Thus, keeping the exchange rate against the dollar 
stable has helped exporters. However, depreciation of the Indian and Pakistani rupee and the 
Vietnamese dong, and China not allowing the yuan to depreciate, has undermined Bangladesh’s 
competitiveness quite significantly in markets where these countries are Bangladesh’s major 
competitors, particularly in the markets for apparels.  
3.2.2 Interest rate management 
Generally, the commercial lending rate in Bangladesh has remained on the high side, against the 
backdrop of a high deposit rate underpinned by high inflation: 9.93% in 2007/08 and 6.66% in 
2008/09. However, at the same time, the spread between lending and deposit rates has persisted as 
high. Proactive measures have been voiced by many quarters to address this issue (Figure 11).  
 
Figure 11: Interest rates (lending and deposit) and spread in Bangladesh, Jul 2008-Sep 2009 (%) 
 
Source: Based on BB (2009a). 
 
Responding to demands from investors, exporters in particular, the BB put in place a ceiling of 13% on 
commercial lending rates on 19 April 2009 for agricultural credit and credit for large and medium 
industries (term loan and working capital), along with loans for the housing sector. However, despite 
the imposition of the cap for these selected sectors, the weighted average rate of interest on 
commercial lending remained above 13% (which was the usual case); from 13.5% in April 2009, the 
weighted average lending rate went up to 13.8% in May 2009 and marginally decreased to 13.6% in July 
2009; recently, this has further declined to 13.1% (September 2009). This appears to be the result also 
of mounting excess liquidity in the banking sector. 
 
The secondary objective of the ceiling, to bring down the spread, has not succeeded at all. The banks 
responded by offering lower rates on deposits, which came down to 7.5% in September 2009 from 
8.2% in April 2009. The spread between the lending and the deposit rate increased to 5.7% in 
September 2009, from 5.4% in April 2009.  
 
However, it is argued in the available literature that the interest rate has only a limited impact on 
private investments in Bangladesh (no response at the aggregate level in the Bangladesh context) 
                                                          
37 Bangladeshi exporters also suffered when the taka appreciated against the euro in 2008. Exporters in Bangladesh are 
generally reluctant to take forward coverage since the taka has a track record of generally depreciating against major 
currencies. 
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(Ahmed and Islam, 2006). As it appears, the move by the BB to put a ceiling on interest rates has not 
had any significant effect in terms of stimulating investments.  
 
3.2.3 Budgetary support for SMEs and cottage industries 
GoB has created three funds with seed money of Tk1000 crore ($144.8 million) to provide refinancing 
facilities to SMEs against loans disbursed by commercial banks and financial institutions. At least 15% 
of this allocation has been earmarked for women entrepreneurs, at an interest rate of 10%. A number of 
tax measures have also been taken for cottage industries. These are currently exempted from VAT and 
instead are required to pay a turnover tax at a rate of 4%, which has a positive impact on costs of 
production. In the budget for 2009/10, eligibility for exemption from VAT for cottage industries has 
been widened to cover relatively larger cottage units.38
 
 Besides, the limit on turnover has been 
proposed to increase to Tk40 lakh ($0.06 million) from Tk24 lakh ($0.03 million). These measures are 
likely to aid cottage industries by decreasing their production costs.  
3.2.4 Domestic demand and investment stimulation 
 
Public investment programme  
It has been argued by many that Bangladesh should pursue policies towards stimulating domestic 
demand in order to counter the impact of the crisis on the domestic economy, as has been done by 
other affected economies. A common recommendation has been to strengthen public investment 
programmes that not only generate employment opportunities but also play a crucial role in stimulating 
private investment through improved infrastructure. The government eventually came up with an ADP39
 
 
much bigger than those of the past years. The total size of the ADP for 2009/10 has been fixed at 
Tk30,500 crore ($4.4 billion), over 55% higher than the implemented ADP of 2008/09 (IMED, 2009). 
However, while a larger ADP indicates the intensions of the government, it is the implementation 
aspect that is a major concern, considering the existing implementation capacity of government 
institutions. In the past, ADP implementation has hovered around 80-85% of the target. The latest 
available information regarding status of ADP implementation indicates similar performance for this 
year. On the other hand, while in percentage terms the ADP utilised for 2009/10 is rather similar to that 
of the previous year, in absolute terms this implies about 31% higher utilisation of funds during the first 
quarter. The government is also trying to remove obstacles causing slower progress in ADP projects, to 
improve implementation status. One critically important issue from the perspective of improving 
implementation has been the complexities in procurement policies, resulting in delays in setting 
projects in motion. The government is currently reviewing the existing Public Procurement Act (PPA 
2006) and the PPR (2008) to remove delaying factors, such as lengthy tendering processes. It will be 
important, however, to ensure that transparency and accountability are not jeopardised in the process 
so that the required quality of implementation can be maintained. 
 
Provision for legalising undisclosed income 
Apart from the larger development expenditure, GoB has also explored other measures to stimulate the 
domestic economy. In the national budget for 2009/10, GoB maintained a provision to legalise 
undisclosed money in the mainstream economy through unquestioned investment facilities in some 
selected industrial and service sectors on payment of 10% as tax. The provision drew criticism from 
different quarters on the grounds of both morality and effectiveness (particularly with regard to 
improving revenue), but it may benefit the capital market and the housing sector in particular, by 
drawing more investments into these sectors. However, it has been argued widely that perhaps it would 
have been better to provide the facility to selected thrust sectors, rather than maintaining its current 
economy-wide nature. 
 
                                                          
38 Previously, cottage units with plants and machineries with a financial involvement of up to Tk15 lakh ($0.02 million) were 
eligible for this exemption. The limit has now been extended to Tk25 lakh ($0.04 million).  
39 The ADP accounts for the major component (over 80%) of public investment in Bangladesh. 
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3.2.5 Duty measures 
 
Lower corporate tax rate  
Bangladesh has maintained a high corporate tax rate of 45% for companies not listed on the stock 
exchange. For listed companies, the tax rate is 37.5%. It has been acknowledged that global 
developments may impact the income and profitability of these companies, particularly financial 
institutions, and in the budget for 2009/10 the corporate tax rate for financial institutions was brought 
down to 42.5%. It is estimated that, in doing so, the government will incur a revenue loss of about 
Tk550 crore ($78.6 million) in the current fiscal year (Bhattacharya et al., 2009). 
 
Lower duty on imports of industrial raw materials  
In an effort to provide support to domestic industries during the crisis, the government has decided to 
reduce the rate of duty on imports of industrial raw materials. The national budget for 2009/10 has 
brought the existing level of 7% down to 5%. However, this measure has been accompanied by 
increased duties on imports of luxury goods to make up the revenue loss incurred from it.  
 
3.2.6 Measures for returnee workers 
Although remittance flows are robust at present, there is a possibility of a lagged effect, given the lower 
number of people now leaving for jobs abroad. To keep the negative impact of the global recession on 
remittance flows at a minimum, GoB has announced the following strategies in the national budget: 1) 
training programmes for skills development of returnee expatriate workers; 2) a diplomatic initiative to 
prevent retrenchment of workers; 3) exploration of new labour markets abroad; and 4) strengthening 
the National Skill Development Council to build a skilled workforce compliant with international labour 
markets. The government has allocated $10.1 million for these purposes (Rahman et al., 2009b). 
 
Although GoB has expressed its commitment to rehabilitating retrenchment-hit returnee migrants, no 
specific measures have been proposed yet to absorb this group of people. Nevertheless, it is expected 
that the policy support (both fiscal and monetary) that has been extended to various labour-intensive 
sectors, including SMEs, agriculture and export-oriented industries, may result in additional job 
opportunities, which would help to an extent to accommodate returnee migrants. The government has 
also strengthened its efforts to directly create new job opportunities. A new programme, titled 
Employment Generation for the Hardcore Poor,40 has been announced to create new employment 
opportunities for 4.9 million man months with an allocation of Tk1176 crore ($170 million), along with a 
National Service Programme41
 
 introduced for Higher Secondary Certificate (HSC) or equivalent 
graduates with an allocation of Tk20 crore ($2.9 million). 
3.2.7 Measures to minimise revenue loss from slower imports 
 
New duty structure  
Crisis-induced slower imports gave rise to concerns over possible revenue losses at the import stage. 
As is detailed in Section 2.4, these concerns later proved to be valid, as significantly lower import duty 
collection was recorded during 2008/09 and also in the early months of the current fiscal year 
(2009/10). At the same time, the national budget for 2009/10 marks a reduction in duties on imports of 
industrial raw materials, from 7% to 5%, to support domestic industries, which would imply further 
revenue loss at the import stage.  
 
Responding to the issue, GoB has made some modifications to the duty structure on imports. An effort 
to balance the loss in import duties has been made, by increasing duties on imports of finished/luxury 
                                                          
40 This programme was introduced to modify the 100-Day Employment Generation Programme, launched during the past 
Caretaker Government, postponing the second phase of the programme. 
41 The beneficiaries will get three months’ training and will be provided with employment for two years in government 
institutions. 
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goods (cars, air conditioners, etc). At the same time, a 5% regulatory duty has been imposed on some 
luxury items with customs duty of 25%.  
 
It is estimated that the current duty structure will result in 5.65% additional revenue (over 2008/09) in 
2009/10, even with zero growth in imports. Assuming a 13% growth in imports for 2009/10, as 
projected in the Medium-Term Macroeconomic Framework (MTMF), it is likely that revenue earnings 
from imports in 2009/10 will be around 11.2% higher than in 2008/09. The new duty structure is, 
therefore, expected to minimise the revenue loss from potential slower imports as a consequence of 
the depressed global situation. 
 
Expansion of the tax net  
Apart from the new import duty structure, the government has also planned various initiatives to bring 
new taxpayers under the tax net through nationwide tax surveys. GoB is also considering withdrawal of 
the provision of tax refunds for government employees from the current fiscal year. It should be noted 
that currently there are only 0.76 million individual taxpayers under the tax net, of whom 0.15 million 
are government employees who get their tax payment refunded. Therefore, the number of effective 
taxpayers is only 0.61 million (2009). 
 
3.2.8 Safety nets for the poor and the vulnerable 
The possible direct and indirect adverse affects of the global economic crisis on the poor and 
marginalised have created a demand for GoB to take additional social protection measures. This 
demand is reflected in the national budget for 2009/10, in which an allocation of Tk14,320 crore ($2 
billion) was made for social safety net programmes. This allocation is 26% higher than that of 2008/09 
and 12.58% of the total budget (2.09% of GDP). Allocations for social empowerment were also 
increased, from Tk2484.0 crore ($359 million) to Tk3007.0 crore ($435 million), which is 2.64% of the 
total budget and 0.44% of GDP. The two employment creation programmes mentioned earlier 
(Employment Generation for the Hardcore Poor and the National Service Programme) have also been 
created as part of safety net programmes. 
 
With regard to strengthening of food security for the poor and vulnerable, the government has allocated 
Tk5877 crore ($851 million) under the Food for Works Programme, Vulnerable Group Feeding, 
Vulnerable Group Development, Test Relief (Food) and Gratuitous Relief (Food), and also as part of food 
assistance to the Chittagong Hill Tracts. 
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4. Global recovery and possible policy implications for Bangladesh 
 
As the recent revised growth projections (Table 14) and other visible indicators suggest, 2010 is 
expected to hold noteworthy improvements in terms of economic activities, leading to increased global 
demand. Revised upward estimates of GDP growth in the US and the EU, coupled with a favourable 
forecast for global output in 2010, indicate that the global economy may soon recover from the slump. 
At the same time, gains in the major stock market indices around the world show definite signs of 
renewed investor confidence. Stabilisation of oil prices in recent months also suggests a favourable 
outlook for oil revenue-dependent countries. 
 
Table 14: GDP growth rate projections, 2009-2010 (%) 
 2009 2010 2009 2010 
IMF projection January 2009* October 2009* 
 World 0.5 3.0 -1.1 3.1 
 US -1.6 1.6 -2.7 1.5 
 Euro area -2.0 0.2 -4.2 0.3 
ADB projection March 2009* September 2009* 
 Asia 3.4 6.0 3.9 6.4 
 South Asia 4.8 6.1 5.6 6.4 
 Bangladesh 5.6 5.2 5.9 5.2 
Note: * Refers to the time when projections were made. 
Sources: ADB (2009a; 2009b); IMF (2009a; 2009b). 
 
Bangladesh should reposition its economy in view of the envisaged global economic recovery. It is 
important to understand the nature and pace of the recovery and to craft policies to take maximum 
advantage of emerging opportunities. Policy responses should take into account the possible structural 
changes that may evolve as a result of the crisis. In recent times, Bangladesh has been trying to 
diversify both its exports and its markets. New export-oriented industries such as shipbuilding and 
leather goods are perceived to have significant potential. Indeed, before the crisis, some visible 
interest in these items was seen from international buyers. During the crisis, for obvious reasons, 
interests waned. With regard to export of labour, some positive movements in skilled and semi-skilled 
labour are becoming visible. Once the recovery gains momentum, Bangladesh is expected to benefit 
from these structural changes. In the above context, the following policy initiatives and interventions 
will require careful consideration. 
  
4.1 Revitalising investments 
 
The investment scenario in Bangladesh will need to be significantly re-energised. What is rather 
discouraging is that, in spite of growth in absolute terms, gross investment as a percentage of GDP 
declined for the third consecutive year in 2008/09.42
 
 Investment has suffered from both a lack of 
infrastructure, including power and communication, and a lack of investor confidence in view of global 
volatility.  
Inadequate power supply has been a major bottleneck deterring industrial development in Bangladesh 
and has severely constrained investment and business activities in the country. New investments are 
being discouraged because of the power crisis, and existing ones are bearing the brunt of frequent 
outages, leading to damage of equipment, production disruption and cost escalation from more 
expensive alternative sources of power. The gap between demand for and supply of electricity reached 
close to 2000 MW in 2008/09. A yawning gap between capacity and generation of electricity is 
emerging for a number of reasons, including gas shortages, ageing power plants and lack of new 
instalment. It is estimated that, during April 2009, for the abovementioned reasons, the average daily 
                                                          
42 Investment is estimated to have been 24.18% of GDP in 2008/09 compared with 24.21% of GDP in 2007/08. 
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shortage was to the tune of 845 MW. In view of ongoing electricity shortages, GoB has taken a number 
of short-term measures, including the introduction of daylight saving time, adjusting the day off in the 
industry sector, reducing the time span that shopping malls can remain open and encouraging small-
scale private power generation.43
 
 Owing to gas shortages, the government recently decided to 
delimit/control the supply of gas to various industrial units (like the fertiliser, yarn and textile 
industries) during evening hours. FGDs with export-oriented industrialists (Rahman et al., 2009b) 
evinced that at least 100 factories are waiting for electricity and gas connections, which the government 
is holding back in order to meet current demand. Investors rate ‘lack of electricity and gas’ as the single 
most important constraint to investment in Bangladesh. Around 800 MW was expected to be added to 
the national grid by the end of December 2009, which it was thought would improve the situation to 
some extent, but latest statistics suggest that the reality was only 475 MW. Much more will need to be 
done in view of the increasing demand.  
Infrastructural development, particularly in power and energy, will be critical and, in this context, the 
announced public–private partnership (PPP) will need to be given due importance.44
 
 Planned 
investment under the PPP initiative is around Tk7000 crore, or $1 billion (about 1% of GDP). However, 
the PPP has been slow to take off over the past five months. A PPP Act would be helpful to make the 
government’s commitment more credible in this regard. 
Public investment has been on the slide for the past decade,45 with the deceleration attributed mostly 
to slow ADP implementation.46
 
 To revive private investment, higher public sector investment is critical 
in the context of Bangladesh. The targeted size of the ADP for 2009/10 is about 4.4% of GDP (55% 
higher than the implemented ADP of the preceding fiscal year). However, as pointed out, during the first 
quarter of 2009/10, only 10% of the announced ADP had been implemented. Thus, a renewed effort will 
be needed in 2009/10 to improve both the quantitative and the qualitative aspects of the ADP, which 
should then be able to stimulate and crowd in private sector investment. Towards this end, institutional 
as well as human resource capacities of relevant agencies of the government will need to be 
substantively strengthened and improved by putting in place adequate resources, capacity-building 
mechanisms and incentive structures. Quality of output and monitoring of outcomes will need to be 
accorded the highest priority in implementing the ADP.  
To stimulate private sector investment, an interest rate policy could play a role. In this case, the BB will 
need to play a leading part in order to reduce the spread between the lending and deposit rates, if need 
be by pursuing a proactive policy in the context of both the ceiling on lending and also the floor on 
deposit rates.  
 
In view of the constraints in mobilising adequate domestic resources, FDI will need to be encouraged. 
Net FDI inflow in the first two months of 2009/10 decreased by 37.3% (although this may not be 
indicative of the expected annual flow). Without improving the domestic investment situation and 
ensuring adequate power supply, it will be difficult to attract significant inflows of FDI. At the moment, 
encouraging FDI both in infrastructure and in modern sectors, focusing on both domestic and 
international markets, should be emphasised along with speedy implementation of development 
projects without compromising their quality.  
 
 
 
                                                          
43 Renewal fees on captive power plants and VAT on domestic generation of power along with domestically 
produced/assembled generators were withdrawn in the budget for 2009/10. 
44 While a PPP component in the budget for 2009/10 is a novel initiative, PPP-led projects operating in infrastructure building, 
particularly in power generation, have already been there for some time now. 
45 Public investment as a percentage of GDP reduced to 4.6% in 2008/09 from 7.2% in 2000/01. 
46 The ADP constitutes about 80% of public investment in Bangladesh. 
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4.2 Supporting export growth 
 
GoB has come up with a number of measures (including cash subsidies) to deal with the decline of 
exports. However, as latest data reveal, negative impacts of the global crisis on Bangladeshi exports 
have intensified in recent months. In consideration of the latest developments, raising efficacy of 
implementation of proposed policy decisions and the stimulus packages will be critical in this context. 
As noted earlier, the provision for presumptive payment of 70% of the cash subsidy claims made under 
the first stimulus has already been implemented. It will be important to settle the remaining claims 
(30%) quickly: their disbursement was announced to take place after audits. Speedy implementation of 
the support given to export-oriented sectors in the second package will also be of critical importance.  
 
In view of the increasing competition from China, Vietnam and other countries, and against the 
backdrop of the incentives being provided there, Bangladesh will need to put concentrated effort into 
holding on to or increasing its market share. The stimulus packages are expected to help export-
oriented sectors in addressing these concerns in the short run. At the same time, it is important that 
workers’ welfare is kept at the centre of attention. As in Sri Lanka, policymakers could consider 
attaching anti-retrenchment conditionalities to the support packages put in place.  
 
4.3 Sustaining aid flows 
 
Bangladesh has managed to negotiate a higher inflow of foreign aid for the current fiscal year and for 
the next few years to come. As discussed earlier, both the World Bank and the ADB have promised 
substantially higher aid to Bangladesh in the current year; enhanced support is also being negotiated 
with China. However, past experiences have shown that a large part of the aid commitments remains 
undisbursed each year owing to low progress with regard to fund utilisation in the early stages, mostly 
because of a failure to achieve satisfactory implementation of ADP projects. The large aid requirement 
to finance the deficit projection for the current fiscal year will call for renewed emphasis on improving 
ADP implementation in the current fiscal year, particularly in aided projects.  
 
As the current process of awarding projects to bidders has been one of the most critical factors 
hindering ADP implementation, the government has recently undertaken an initiative to simplify the 
procedure to facilitate speedy initiation of projects by amending the PPA 2006 and PPR 2008. However, 
some amendment proposals have drawn criticism from the major development partners, i.e. the World 
Bank and the ADB, and created uncertainties about fund release by these institutions. These include 
setup of a lottery for awarding projects, exclusion of experience requirement for projects not exceeding 
Tk5 million ($0.07 million), etc. Contentious issues will need to be settled as early as possible to avoid 
further delays and deterioration of the ADP implementation record (and hence to materialise aid 
commitments) in the current fiscal year. This will also be important in view of the relatively larger size of 
the ADP proposed in the budget for 2009/10. Underutilisation of ADP allocations will be costly from the 
perspective of creating employment, increasing domestic demand and stimulating private investments. 
 
4.4 Sustaining remittance flow 
 
Concomitantly maintaining outward migration and robust remittance flows will be of high importance in 
order to absorb the huge number of new aspirants entering the job market every year, and also from the 
perspective of their significance as a contributor to foreign currency reserves and as a potential source 
of financing investments. To address the negative impact of the global crisis on remittance flows and to 
sustain outward migration, the government could consider the following strategies to minimise certain 
longstanding issues, which are rather general in nature but have become that much more important in 
view of dealing with the crisis. 
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Lowering the cost of migration  
Strict monitoring and enforcement systems need to be deployed to reduce unscrupulous recruitment 
practices and ensure that agent commissions fixed by GoB are implemented properly. Awareness 
should be strengthened about fees and service charges to be claimed by agents of recruiting agencies 
from aspirant workers. Recruitment and migration procedures need to involve a minimum number of 
intermediaries and transaction costs must be kept as low as possible. Formal channels of transaction 
should be rendered more flexible, accessible, fast and cost effective. The government may work with 
major labour-importing countries to allow transfer of jobs by migrant workers without any transfer fee. 
Kuwait has already agreed to provide such flexibility to Bangladeshi workers.  
 
Training  
Appropriate training to improve human resources is the most important factor to enhance market 
opportunities for migrant workers. Emphasis should be given to specialised training programmes with 
the target of meeting the needs of specific human resource importers. Some particular categories (e.g. 
nurses, medical technicians, caring service providers) need to be identified, for which the country has 
the potential to develop highly skilled manpower. Quick implementation of such training programmes 
will be particularly important to take advantage of the global recovery and consequent demand 
enhancement for migrant workers. In this context, allocation of Tk70 crore ($10.1 million) in the national 
budget for 2009/10 to form a Skill Development Fund is worth mentioning and much appreciated. The 
fund will be used for the expansion of labour markets abroad, to conduct research exploring new 
labour markets, to provide training for prospective workers and for retraining for returned migrants. 
 
Loan facilities for aspirant and returnee workers 
Traditional banks have not always provided adequate services to aspirant migrant workers. Thus, to 
offer financial services and other related support to retrenched and returnee migrants, the initiative to 
establish a probashi bank (bank for non-residents) should be geared up and implemented without 
delay. According to available information from the BMET, a proposal to establish such an institution 
has been submitted to the BB for approval. However, it may take time to finalise the modus operandi, 
even though the initiative has been approved. GoB should use the existing expatriate welfare fund to 
provide loans/credit to returnee migrants to help them start businesses of their own.  
 
Diplomatic missions  
GoB should strengthen the operations of diplomatic missions in the Middle East and Southeast Asian 
countries. Legal advisors in major labour destinations could be appointed in order to provide legal 
support to deprived Bangladeshi workers. Diplomatic missions need to be extended further to explore 
potential new markets for human resource exports, to develop strategic partnerships with them and to 
ensure the rights of migrant workers. With a view to expanding international cooperation on migration, 
international organisations can promote dialogue and encourage exchange of best practices on 
migration management among countries in a regional context. 
 
4.5 Enhancing alternative sources of revenue mobilisation 
 
In light of the growing need for development spending and to extend support measures to deal with the 
global crisis, there is an urgent need to stimulate revenue generation in Bangladesh without disrupting 
support to producers and external trade flows. It should be recalled that, in Bangladesh, public revenue 
is rather import dependent in the absence of appropriate measures to bring more people under the 
domestic tax net. In view of the crisis, revenue collection efforts in the coming year will be somewhat 
constrained, so exploiting the untapped reserve of direct tax sources will be seen as a major task. The 
major issues that need immediate attention to attain revenue targets for 2009/10 are as follows. 
 
Tax surveys to widen the tax net 
Tax authorities need to execute a drive to bring more people under the tax net. Bangladesh has around 
2.3 million registered Tax Identification Number (TIN) holders, of whom only about 0.76 million 
submitted their tax returns this year (NBR, 2009b). The government has already announced an initiative 
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to bring in about 0.4 million new taxpayers under the tax net, through new tax surveys, by next year, 
but it will be equally important to reach out to the large informal sector that exists in the economy. 
 
Over the past two decades, the nominal income of people living in municipality and upazila (sub-
district) areas is perceived to have gone up significantly. However, owing to an absence of tax officials 
at peri-urban levels, collection of taxes from these areas has not increased. Along with tapping the 
microeconomic tax base, expansion and supervision of the Large Taxpayers’ Unit (LTU) is necessary.47
 
 
Settling legal disputes over NBR recruitment  
Owing to legal disputes, the NBR has not been able to expand its manpower capacity adequately since 
the mid-1980s. These disputes need to be settled and an effective revenue administration, staffed with 
a well-trained and motivated workforce and adequate IT support to track the paper trail, must be 
developed to realise revenue objectives. 
 
Simplification of tax laws and facilitating online tax return submission  
In order to ensure clarity, transparency and predictability, tax laws need to be made taxpayer friendly. 
Promoting the use of a ‘self-assessment system’ may significantly increase the revenue of the 
government by bringing taxpayers in personal contact with the revenue administration without the help 
of intermediaries. The feasibility of online tax return submissions should also be tested. 
 
4.6 Maintaining macroeconomic balances 
 
Bangladesh was successful in maintaining macroeconomic stability with moderate growth throughout 
the first half of this decade. During 2007 and 2008, macroeconomic management was directed to deal 
with ‘agflationary’ pressure as a result of the worldwide surge in food prices. During July 2007 to 
September 2008, inflation in Bangladesh tended to remain at two-digit level.48
 
 Since then, the world 
economic situation has changed and macroeconomic policies in Bangladesh have had to adapt to the 
changing reality. Prompted by the global financial crisis, policies have been redirected towards crisis 
management. Bangladesh, with its late entry to the crisis, has dedicated full force to addressing the 
adverse impact of the recession only in recent times. However, global prices may once again start to 
rise in view of the expected recovery. International oil prices have been rising, and are likely to continue 
on this upward trend as the world economy recovers in the early part of 2010. 
In Bangladesh, food prices generally drive inflationary trends. The international price of rice (Thailand, 
25% broken) declined to $410 per metric ton in recent times from the higher level of 2008. However, in 
the Bangladesh context, it is important to note that India experienced its lowest food grain production 
in recent history in 2009 and may need to import food this year.57 Thus, it is important that Bangladesh 
be able to achieve its targets for crop production. Soybean prices have been going up and may create 
volatility in the domestic market; however, the price of urea has been rather stable in the global market 
(Figure 12). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
47 The LTU has been set up specifically to examine the performance and returns of large enterprises that account for a 
significant share in total direct tax collection in Bangladesh. 
48 Average food inflation during the reported period was even higher, at 12%. 
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Figure 12: Movements in global commodity prices, Jan 2007-Oct 2009 (US$) 
 
Note: The right-hand axis shows the price of soybean oil; the left-hand axis shows the price of rice and urea. 
Sources: World Bank (2009a; 2009b). 
 
These global developments, coupled with domestic contingencies, will require prudent macroeconomic 
management. Inflation in Bangladesh has been on the low side with the progress of the global crisis, 
reaching 2.3% in June 2009.49
 
 However, inflation has again been on the rise since July 2009 (Figure 13). 
A continuation of this trend could pose a threat to the maintenance of macroeconomic stability in the 
near-term perspective. 
Figure 13: Inflationary trends in Bangladesh, Jan 2006-Oct 2009 (%) 
 
 Source: Based on BBS (2009b). 
 
Bangladesh’s budget deficit has been under control in recent times, amounting to 3.3% of GDP in 
2008/09. In the face of the deepening impact of the crisis, the government had to opt for a higher 
deficit, which could create some inflationary pressure if budgetary expenditure targets are realised at 
the end of the fiscal year.50
                                                          
49 At the same time, food inflation in Bangladesh reached its all time low (0.3%). 
 On the other hand, lack of import demand, coupled with buoyant remittance 
50 However, during the first two months of 2009/10, deficit financing was not required, thanks to sluggish implementation of 
the ADP. 
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flows, has helped Bangladesh accumulate significant foreign exchange reserves. The BB has been 
vigilant in maintaining exchange rate stability and has been buying foreign currency from the open 
market on a regular basis to maintain a balance between demand and supply for US dollars. The 
foreign exchange reserve is now equivalent to about 6 months of import payments. 
 
The relief and security in the area of balance of payments is definitely a positive development. To some 
extent, this may also help ensure food security, i.e. using foreign exchange for food import payments. 
However, foreign exchange management has led to an increased flow of money supply in the domestic 
market, which could lead to inflationary pressure in the economy. Keeping in mind that excess liquidity 
with scheduled banks is already very high,51
 
 the central bank has actively participated by mopping up 
the money supply from time to time, using various monetary instruments, mainly in the form of reverse 
repo.  
However, to ensure food security and to keep inflation in check, much will depend on whether 
Bangladesh can replicate its recent success in crop production.52
 
 In this context, balancing the 
apparently conflicting interests of consumers and producers will once again be the major challenge for 
Bangladesh’s policymakers. Stimulating productivity of agriculture through prudent subsidy policy, 
providing incentives to promote adoption of high-yielding varieties and adoption of technology must be 
given due priority in policymaking (CPD, 2009). Managing the market should once again be on the 
policy agenda, and the government must exercise due vigilance in terms of developments on the global 
scene. 
 
                                                          
51 Excess liquidity with the scheduled banks doubled in the past one year owing to weak investment and import demand. 
52 Production of food grains in 2008/09 was 8.0% higher than in the previous year. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
In the preceding analysis, an attempt is made to capture the impact of the ongoing global financial 
crisis on the increasingly globalising economy of Bangladesh, by tracing the impacts through various 
transmission channels. Although the Bangladeshi economy has been spared the worst consequences 
of the crisis, particularly because its financial and capital markets are by and large isolated from global 
markets, there was no escaping the adverse effects once the crisis started to deepen. As the crisis 
evolved and developed, Bangladesh suffered from a slowdown in export earnings, a lower number of 
workers going abroad, lower revenue earnings and a loss of competitiveness in view of stimulus 
packages put in place by other countries.  
 
The first stimulus package was geared mainly towards domestic demand stimulation, with only a 
limited amount of support to a number of non-RMG export sectors. In September 2009, exports of 
apparels experienced a 27% dip compared with the previous year. As such, the stimulus package 
announced in October 2009 was more of a reactive one.  
 
Exports started to pick up again in October (18% growth), indicating increasing volatility in 
Bangladesh’s export market. Although exporters argued that the government should have provided 
incentives earlier, whereas the government has tended to design policies based on market signals, 
there is now a general agreement that, notwithstanding volatility in export performance, a stimulus was 
required in view of shrinking profits, a lower migration rate, the impact of policies pursued by 
competitors and the need to take advantage of opportunities originating from the incipient global 
recovery. There is a growing feeling that, in spite of the signs of recovery, lagged negative impacts will 
continue to be felt in Bangladesh’s job market, in prices offered for Bangladesh’s exports and the 
consequent adverse terms of trade, in profit margins and in the trade balance, with possibility of export 
earnings falling behind the pace of the rise in import bills.  
 
GoB has made an attempt to enhance its safety net and employment programmes, which will need to 
be strengthened further in view of the nature of global recovery (jobless growth, lower demand for 
migrant labour, etc). Higher allocations to agriculture and continuing support to stimulate higher crop 
production will be required particularly from the perspective of ensuring food security, which could 
become an issue in 2010 in view of the expected global food availability situation. In view of this, 
government’s focus on agriculture both in the first stimulus package and in the budget for 2009/10 
appears to be well justified. Here, the tension between the urgency to keep food prices low and 
providing adequate incentives to farmers to grow more food will be a challenge. Policy support to raise 
productivity and lower costs at farmer level will be the major tasks to be addressed in this context.  
 
It is too early to make an assessment of the efficacy and effectiveness of GoB’s stimulus packages. 
Additional cash incentives to apparels and other export-oriented sectors are obviously going to benefit 
the exporters. In the context of the emerging situation with regard to Bangladesh’s competitive 
strength in the global market, a renewed effort will be required to enhance productivity in the export-
oriented sectors. The government’s stimulus package does contain additional support for encouraging 
access to new markets, but additional support will be required for product diversification (such as the 
promising shipbuilding sector, which could receive some fresh air in view of the rise in global trade).  
 
The Bangladeshi economy suffered from higher inflation during the pre-crisis period. Indeed, the 
financial crisis that followed did not allow Bangladesh much leeway to take the corrective measures 
necessary to mitigate the adverse impacts of the rise in commodity prices and its adverse 
consequences for the economy. The need to pursue countercyclical policies during the ongoing crisis 
has meant that scarce resources have had to be diverted from sectors that are critical to achievement 
of the poverty-reducing Millennium Development Goal (MDG) targets. All this will require a restructuring 
of resource allocations once recovery sets in and the worst impacts of the crisis are over for 
Bangladesh.  
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Bangladesh has been identified as one of the most vulnerable economies in terms of climate change, 
and the expected fall in global food production this year could mean Bangladesh is confronted with 
challenges in terms of food security, which will need to be addressed through higher domestic food 
production. Inflation management will also be crucial, no doubt. As Bangladesh prepares for the future, 
there will be a need to be sensitive to these challenges. 
 
Bangladesh’s macroeconomic management over the near term will, thus, need to be crafted carefully 
by building on the demonstrated resilience of the economy, by addressing the emergent lagged 
impacts and by taking advantage of the opportunities offered by a recovering global economy. 
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